Niger

Economic growth driven by oil and agriculture

Growth, which is consistently driven by the oil sector and agriculture, reached 6.9% in 2025, but is expected to slow slightly to 6.7% in 2026 and later to 6.5% in 2027. Oil has recently become the main driver of export growth, whereas uranium was historically the leading export item. Regarding oil infrastructure, the historic pipeline connecting the Agadem fields to the SORAZ refinery in Zinder was transferred to state ownership in May 2026 and is managed by the newly created state-owned company SNPI under the terms of the agreement signed with the Chinese state-owned oil company CNPC in May 2026. The agreement reduces the pipeline transportation rate to the Benin oil terminal from USD 27 to USD 15 per barrel. It also provides for the transfer of 45% of the equity in WAPCO—the operator of the Niger section and a subsidiary of CNPC—to the government. However, the pipeline continues to post disappointing results generating approximately 50% of projected throughput targets. Last, the uranium industry, marked by the nationalisation of Somaïr (a subsidiary of the French company Orano) in 2025, is operating at reduced capacity. New partners are being sought. The state-owned company TNUC, founded in 2024, has signed an agreement with Russia’s Uranium One to develop future mines. The Canadian group Global Atomic is the only Western operator still present and has the explicit support of the government. The group holds a 20% public stake in its subsidiary SOMIDA and aims to bring its Dasa mine online in the second half of 2026.

Although the oil sector is gaining momentum, the economy continues to be driven by agriculture, which accounts for 40% of GDP and 80% of employment. Rainfed grains (primarily millet and sorghum) form the staple of the population’s diet (85% of domestic consumption). 2025 saw a strong recovery in grain production, which is expected to continue into 2026. To support this vital sector, the World Bank has commitments on 24 operations (14 national and 10 regional) totalling USD 4.7 billion, of which 11% is allocated directly to agriculture. In particular, it is financing the development of irrigation and livestock farming (PACIPA), aimed at expanding the irrigated area (from 18,000 to 39,700 hectares by 2027). It is also funding a Food Systems Resilience Program (PRSA) that provides for the distribution of seeds and fertilisers, as well as the sharing of agro-hydro-meteorological information with approximately 70,000 farmers. Agriculture harbours significant potential for Niger, conditional on greater resilience to climate shocks, improved roads and energy independence. With these perspectives in mind, various projects are under way: the upcoming completion of the Kandadji hydroelectric dam, built by the Chinese company China Gezhouba, is expected to generate 130 MW of electricity, with irrigation capacity of 45,000 hectares. A thermal power plant financed by Algeria has been commissioned, while the coal-fired power complex in Salkadamma was declared a public utility in June 2026.

Inflation has picked up moderately in 2026 following the widespread decline in prices in 2025 due to good harvests and the base effect. At the same time, household consumption grew by 6.3%. To support economic activity and ease financing conditions, the BCEAO lowered its key policy rate by 0.25 percentage points, from 3.25% to 3.0%. The government also included measures in the 2026 budget bill to support purchasing power and domestic production. The public deficit is expected to widen temporarily due to deferred investment spending and post-flood rehabilitation needs.

Prudent budget management and oil assets

The budget deficit has stabilised at around 3% (the UEMOA standard) thanks to rising government revenues as part of the IMF-supported fiscal consolidation. The government is expected to collect more revenue through increased oil exports, a reduction in tax exemptions, broader tax collection and efforts to combat corruption. In addition, public financial management has improved with the gradual rollout of the Single Treasury Account (“CUT” in French), targeted tax collection and a reduction in arrears. Priority expenditures are being maintained: security, health, reconstruction and assistance to vulnerable households. Certain expenditures are increasing, such as infrastructure investments: irrigation, energy (dams) and major projects that boost domestic production. The budget is expected to remain on track through 2027 provided that security and humanitarian expenditures do not rise too sharply.

The public debt-to-GDP ratio is well below the UEMOA benchmark of 70%. Some 61% of the debt is held by external creditors—multilateral and bilateral lenders—on concessional terms. The IMF is expected to approve a 10th disbursement under the Extended Credit Facility which will be used to cover external financing needs. The remainder of the debt is held by the local and regional banking sector in the form of government securities that generally yield over 10%. The country faces a significant refinancing peak in 2026: 869.01 billion FCF (the equivalent of EUR 1.3 billion) in government securities will mature, representing 43% of the outstanding debt.

The current account deficit is structural because, even though exports are increasing (focused on a few extractive and agricultural products), a great deal of equipment and services are imported to compensate for the lack of transportation, equipment and skills, particularly expertise in the extractive sector. Improvement will come primarily from oil, thanks to the Niger-Benin pipeline, which will already enable a large portion of the 35 million barrels produced in 2026 to be exported. ?The nationalisation of foreign extractive companies, the harmonisation of wages between nationals and foreigners, and the reduction in the number of positions held by Chinese workers are reducing net outflows of primary income. Secondary income helps offset the current account deficit, but its contribution has declined since 2023 due to decreased budgetary aid.

Increased security risks and rejection of long-standing partners

On 26 July 2023, President Mohamed Bazoum, who had been democratically elected in February 2021, was overthrown by members of the presidential guard. Joined by other branches of the armed forces, the coup leaders established the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), headed by Abdourahamane Tiani, the self-proclaimed president. On 26 March 2025, a transitional charter entered into effect, setting a five-year transition period leading up to elections in 2030, which may be extended in the event of security risks or delays in reforms. This charter also dissolved the 172 existing political parties. The initial popular support fuelled by nationalisations is waning due to persistently high poverty, which affects 41% of the population, but above all owing to ongoing insecurity. The junta has been forced to contend with a jihadist insurgency originating in Burkina Faso and Mali (two attacks on Niamey Airport in January and July 2026).

Since the withdrawal of Western forces (particularly the French), Niger has strengthened its security cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Relations with Algeria have improved, as evidenced by the return of ambassadors in 2026 and the resumption of construction on the Nigeria-Niger-Algeria gas pipeline. Dialogue has also resumed with Benin, which has just elected a new president, Romuald Wadagni. Both nations are working towards a reopening of their shared border.

Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Niamey in July 2026 testified to warmer relations between the two nations. The purpose of his visit was to deepen military and technical cooperation via the Africa Corps. Niger has strengthened ties with other non-Western countries, such as China and Turkey. Conversely, relations with the West (which accounts for 51% of Niger’s exports), and particularly with France and the US, have deteriorated.

Last updated: July 2026